



# The Declining Role of Islamic Politics and The Jokowi's Factors in the 2024 Presidential Election: A Study of Contemporary Political Policies and Dynamics in Indonesia

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## ABSTRACT

**Research Problem:** This abstract discusses the complex challenges faced by Islamic parties in the 2024 presidential election related to Jokowi's role as president. This report focuses on the dynamics of constellation formation between candidates competing in the 2024 presidential election.

**Research purposes:** The main aim of this abstract is to examine the complexity of the problems faced by Islamic parties in the 2024 presidential election. This report aims to explain why Islamic parties cannot unite, but instead try to defeat each other in the election, due to the existence of forces outside of them who are capable of determine political dynamics in a presidential system.

**Research methods:** Methodologically, this abstract refers to a case study of the experience of Islamic parties in contesting the 2024 presidential election in Indonesia. This report uses a qualitative analysis approach to investigate the political dynamics of the 2024 presidential election which also involves the influence of President Jokowi.

**Results and Discussion:** This abstract discusses the challenges faced by political parties in Indonesia, especially Islamic political parties, in the 2024 presidential election which will be held simultaneously with the legislative elections. President Jokowi's influence is important in popularizing political parties that support the presidential candidates he supports, so that it also influences the results of the legislative elections for each Islamic party.

**Research Implications and Contributions:** This abstract provides a comprehensive overview of the challenges faced by Islamic parties, both those that already exist and those that are just emerging in the 2024 elections. This report invites further research and discussion regarding important external (influence of the President in power) and internal aspects of Islamic parties. (institutional power and their consolidation).

**Keywords:** Islamic parties, 2024 presidential election, President Jokowi, Indonesia

## INTRODUCTION

Islam is the religion with the largest number of adherents in Indonesia. Data released by the Directorate General of Population and Civil Registration (Dukcapil) of the Ministry of Home Affairs noted that out of Indonesia's population of 273.87 million people as of December 31, 2021, 238.09 million people, or 86.93% of the population, were Muslim (Databoks.katadata.co.id, 2022). Compared with other Muslim-majority countries, Indonesia ranks first in terms of population size. From a democratic perspective, Indonesia is also known as the largest Muslim-majority democracy, being the world's third-largest democracy overall. This has become a topic of research in studies on Muslim democracy, as explored by Mujani and Liddle (2007) and Künkler and Stepan (2013). Thus, the democratic process in Indonesia continues to draw global attention, as the success or failure of democracy in Indonesia also serves as a benchmark for the extent to which a Muslim-majority nation can successfully uphold democratic values.

Since the fall of the New Order regime under Suharto in 1998, political policies have changed dramatically. The Reform Era, marking a new historical phase in Indonesian politics, introduced fundamental changes in political policy. In terms of political parties and elections, this shift was profound, as the transitional government under President B.J. Habibie enacted regulations that opened wide political space for citizens to establish political parties. During the New Order era (1966-1998), electoral power was limited to three participating parties. However, in the Reform Era, every election since 1999 and the 2004 presidential election has involved an average of more than ten political parties. This indicates that the party system in Indonesia during the reform period is not a simple one-party system but a complex, multi-party system (Haris, 2014).

In the present context, it is essential to examine how Indonesia faces challenges in maintaining democracy amid its dynamic political landscape and complex multi-party system. Given Islam's significant role in shaping national identity, recent studies on Indonesian democracy do not merely focus on electoral processes but also on how political participation in a predominantly Muslim society intersects with the vibrant, multi-party democracy. Additionally, new challenges have emerged in the form of increased identity politics and ideological competition, which may impact political and social stability. In this situation, the success of democracy in Indonesia could serve as a unique model for other Muslim-majority nations seeking to foster democracy amidst diversity.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **Historical Context**

Historically, the development of Islam in Indonesia cannot be separated from the political dynamics that accompany it. The development of Islamic history in Indonesia to date has entered distinctive political historical phases. In general, to simplify things, it is divided into three historical contexts, the pre-colonial period, the colonial period and the post-colonial period. Each period has different characteristics, but at least the periodization of history in this way shows that the history of Islam in Indonesia experienced continuity and change, with varied and dynamic aspects.

Changes and continuity in Islamic politics in Indonesia after independence in 1945 until today, can be briefly described as basically the reality of electoral politics experiencing significant degradation (Rubenstein, 2017). In Indonesia's first election in 1955, Islamic political parties played an important role, along with their real political power. The Masyumi Party was the second winner in the 1955 elections, after the Indonesian National Party (PNI). Meanwhile, the Nahdlatul Ulama Party (NU) is in third place. The combination of the Masyumi Party and the NU Party as an Islamic political force in parliament and government is the majority. However, the politics of the parliamentary democracy era of the 1950s were very dynamic, meaning they did not automatically always form coalitions to realize joint policies.

Political fragmentation at the level of the Islamic political elite in Indonesia has long and complicated historical roots since the Dutch colonial era. The experience of democracy in Indonesia in the 1950s seems to have made the Islamic political segment reflect on itself. Especially when the President Sukarno factor was dominant. He dissolved parliamentary democracy and made an experiment which he called Guided Democracy since 1959. In the Guided Democracy era (1959-1965), Sukarno gave wind to the Communist forces represented by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which in fact was anti-Islamic political forces. In an experiment marked by the existence of three political axes Nationalist, Religions, Communist (NASAKOM), religious groups split. Masyumi refused on the grounds of defending democracy, but the NU Party accepted on the pretext that there should still be Islamic representation in government.

The history of Islamic politics in Indonesia in its development experienced a depoliticization of their role during the New Order regime under Suharto (1966-1998). In 1973 the New Order regime made a policy of simplifying political parties. In the realm of Islamic politics, Suharto rejected the rehabilitation of Masyumi, which together with the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) had been dissolved by Sukarno's Guided Democracy regime. Suharto approved the neo-Masyumi party, Parmusi, who in the first election of the New Order in 1971 was a participant among ten others. The 1973 policy in the form of a fusion of political parties forcibly merged Islamic parties (Parmusi, NU, PSII, Perti) into the United Development Party (PPP). The other parties became the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). These two parties, together with Golongan Karya (Golkar), were contestants in the New Order elections.

In every New Order election, Golkar was always the winner, because it was supported by the ruling regime which used the military and bureaucracy as a winning machine.

### **Reformation Era Political Experiences**

The context of this study is the Reformation era elections which have taken place since 1999. After the 1999-2002 constitutional amendments carried out by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the presidential election was carried out directly by the people, not by the parliament (MPR). The 2024 presidential election is the sixth since 1999. This study uses a political approach, in terms of policy and contestation between interested actors. The focus of the study is to review the process of forming a political constellation for the 2024 presidential election involving political parties that have the right to form coalitions in presenting candidates for the presidential election. Study of the candidacy process in the presidential election.

The presidential election candidacy process always attracts public attention, because of its dynamic process involving political parties in determining coalitions. In this context, the process is elitist, because the public can only watch and comment, but cannot determine who the candidates are formally proposed by the political parties. The public can only become election participants who have limited voting rights.

Coalition experiments between Islamic parties emerged at the beginning of the Reformation era, in the 1999 elections. This experiment was interesting, because they finally agreed to present KH Abdurrahman Wahid as a presidential candidate who ultimately won the presidential election contest at the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). At that time, the presidential election had not yet been held directly in Indonesia. The political battle for the presidential election in the MPR necessitates important and determining roles for the political elites in the post-legislative election constellation. PDIP is the strongest party in parliament, owning the majority of seats. However, there was resistance among other parties, benefiting the Center Axis (*Poros Tengah*) coalition supporting Abdurrahman Wahid. Unfortunately, Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency did not last long, because in 2002 he was impeached. The MPR immediately chose Megawati Soekarnoputri, who was previously vice president (Barton, 2002).

After the 1999 election until today, Islamic parties are in fact unable to exist as a single, solid force. They were unable to present their own candidate in the presidential election. In fact, if they really tried, they could nominate their own candidates. Various analyzes state that pragmatic considerations of power politics are far more prioritized than ideological considerations or solidarity between Islamic-inspired parties. The phenomenon of transactional pragmatism along with the strengthening of clientelism which has become symptomatic in political contestation in Indonesia, inevitably also occurs in the realm of Islamic political parties (Aspinnal and Berenschot, 2019). In reality, Islamic parties also have to compete with plural parties which have also realized that they have to accommodate Islamic aspirations through their party wings, towards an ideology of inclusive nationalism. (Baswedan 2004).

The pattern of formation of coalitions supporting presidential election candidates in Indonesia, from 2004 to 2024, remains relatively the same. The policies taken by elites who determine political parties tend to be polarized based on the experience of previous presidential elections. In the 2004 presidential election, the political party on the side that later won the presidential election, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – Jusuf Kalla. At that time, the Islamic party PPP still had confidence, nominating its general chairman Hamzah Haz as a presidential candidate. Hamzah previously served as vice president when Megawati appeared as president replacing Abdurrahman Wahid.

After the administration of president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in the 2014 presidential election, a figure from the Islamic party PAN Hatta Rajasa became Prabowo Subianto's vice presidential candidate as the presidential candidate of the Gerindra Party. However, the 2014 presidential election was won by Jokowi – Jusuf Kalla. Not all Islamic parties are in the Prabowo - Hatta ranks, let alone able to optimally obtain vote support from their constituents. In the 2019 presidential election, the coalition of parties supporting Jokowi - KH Ma'ruf Amien, is more realistic in gaining support from Islamic parties whose votes are significant, rather than those who support their competitors. Jokowi - Ma'ruf's significant vote acquisition in the 2019 presidential election cannot be separated from the support of elite Islamic social organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (Mietzner, 2023).

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### Result

In Indonesia, Islamic parties have become accustomed to competing or collaborating with open parties (Fox and Menchik, 2023). Throughout the Reform Era they have been dynamic in various national and local election contestations. This also means emphasizing that Islamic political parties are not a single entity that is united with each other. Considering they also compete with each other. The historical notes on Islamic politics above at least confirm this phenomenon. This will also happen in the 2024 presidential election.

Regarding the 2024 presidential election, as with previous presidential elections, Islamic parties are divided in supporting different presidential candidates. At least this confirms that their consideration of presidential candidacy does not include ideological considerations, but rather pragmatic ones. On November 13 2023, the General Election Commission (KPU) inaugurated three presidential candidates in the 2024 presidential election. The first candidate number Anies Rasyid Baswedan – Muhaimin Iskandar was proposed by the National Democratic Party (Nasdem), the National Awakening Party (PKB) and Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Candidate number 2 Prabowo Subianto – Gibran Rakabuming Raka proposed by the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), Golkar Party, Democrat Party, National Mandate Party (PAN), Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), Gelora Indonesia Party, Crescent Star Party (PBB), and the Garuda Party and Prima Party. Candidate number 3 is Ganjar Pranowo – M Mahfud MD proposed by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), United Development Party (PPP), Indonesian Unity Party (Perindo), and People's Conscience Party (Hanura) (kpu.go.id, 2023).

In the political context of the presidential election, Islamic parties are not in the same political chemistry. They are not converged or fused but split into three different candidates. The Islamic parties in candidate coalition number 1 are PKB and PKS, in candidate number 2 there are PAN, PBB and Gelora Indonesia, in candidate number 3 there is PPP. What is meant by Islamic parties in this context are political parties whose vision and mission are coloured by Islamic political norms or which bear Islamic symbols, and what is looser than this definition is political parties based on Islamic masses (Romli, 2004).

The reality of the disintegration of the coalition of Islamic parties in the 2024 presidential election is truly paradoxical to their chances of being able to nominate their own candidates for the presidential election. Referring to Law number 7 / 2017 article 222, candidates are proposed by political parties or combinations of political parties participating in the election who meet the requirements for obtaining seats of at least 20% of the total DPR seats or obtaining 25% of the valid votes nationally in the previous DPR member election.

Table 1 below shows that the combined Islamic parties that have seats in the DPR as a result of the 2019 elections reached 29.72%. Not only in the case of the 2024 presidential election, in all presidential elections since 2004 which have been carried out through direct choice by voters, the formation of a coalition between Islamic parties is unimaginable. They split into loose coalitions with open parties.

**Table 1. Percentage of seats for Islamic parties in the DPR as a result of the 2019 elections**

Political Party	Seats	Percentage
PPP	19	3.30
PKB	58	10.08
PAN	44	7.65
PBB	0	0
PKS	50	8.69
Total	-	29.72

Source: KPU 2019

In the PPP case, in reality its electoral performance in the Reformation Era elections since 1999 has tended to decline. The cause is certainly not unique in this case. Therefore, in the context of this research, the Jokowi factor in the 2024 elections is casuistry. Table 2 shows the decreasing trend in PPP votes and seats from 1999-2024, where the highest vote acquisition occurred in the 1999 election and the lowest in 2024. In the 2014 election, after falling to 5.42% (the 2009 election vote), it experienced increase. returned to 6.53%. However, after that the PPP's vote share fell again in the 2019 election and lost seats in 2024.

**Table 2. Trend of decreasing PPP votes 1999-2024**

<b>Election</b>	<b>Votes (%)</b>	<b>Seats</b>
1999	11,329,905 (10.71%)	58 / 500
2004	9,248,764 (8.15%)	58 / 550
2009	5,544,332 (5.32%)	38 / 560
2014	8,157,488 (6.53%)	39 / 560
2019	6,323,147 (4.52%)	19 / 575
2024	5,878,777 (3.87%)	0 / 580

Source: KPU, 2024 (Processed)

### **Rule of Law and Political Constellations**

The determinants of the formation of the political constellation for the 2024 Presidential Election are the political parties that obtain seats in the People's Representative Council (DPR) in the 2019 legislative elections. The provisions are regulated in article 221 of the Election Law Number 7/2017 that candidates are proposed by political parties or combinations of political parties participating in the election. meet the requirements for obtaining seats of at least 20% of the number of seats in the DPR or 25% of the valid votes nationally in the previous legislative (DPR) elections.

The provisions of this law mean that political parties that meet the requirements to be able to form a coalition to nominate candidates for the presidential election must consider who they will support and how to communicate this with other parties. Likewise with Islamic parties, they must think and act inclusively, they cannot necessarily think exclusively in the sense of having to collaborate in the candidacy process with only fellow Islamic parties. They must be able to collaborate with even political parties that are ideologically different in tracing the trajectory of their political history since the distant past.

As the 2024 presidential election approaches, the political constellation of candidate supporters, as noted above, cannot be separated from the political dynamics that accompany it. First, the split between Jokowi as president, who wants himself to be the king maker, and Megawati Soekarnoputri as PDIP General Chair, who wants Jokowi to comply with the provisions of the party that always supports him. The crucial point occurred after the decision of the Constitutional Court (MK) which changed the age rules for presidential and vice-presidential candidates, so that Jokowi's son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, could appear as vice-presidential candidate. Paired with Prabowo Subianto, Gibran received support from the coalition political parties that supported him, the majority of which were the coalition political parties of President Jokowi's government.

### **Jokowi Factors**

Ahead of the 2024 presidential election, President Jokowi's popularity is still quite high. Several poll results from survey institutions show this. The results of the Indonesian Indikator Poll released a few days before the February 14 2024 voting, for example, confirm this. The survey was conducted January 28–February 4 2024, using the face method. Sampling used the multistage random sampling method with a total sample of 5,500 respondents. To the question of whether they were satisfied with President Jokowi's work, the answer was 16.7% very satisfied; quite satisfied 62.8%; less satisfied 17.7%, and not satisfied at all 2.4% (Indikator.co.id 2024). However, the consistently high popularity of government work, which in fact focuses on President Jokowi, has become a separate consideration for political parties in the presidential election candidacy process.

Theoretically, the political coalition in a presidential system is looser than the political coalition in

a parliamentary system of government. However, in the case of Indonesia in the context of the 2024 presidential election, the personality factor of a president really determines the formation of his political constellation. The Jokowi factor is important in directing where the heads of political parties supporting the government officially propose their candidates. At first Jokowi seemed at a crossroads as to whether to present Ganjar Pranowo or Prabowo Subianto as the presidential candidate he would support. However, because Megawati or the PDIP saw nepotism in the decision making of the Constitutional Court led by Anwar Usman as a constitutional judge who was also Gibran Rakabuming Raka's uncle, the PDIP's support became stronger for Ganjar Pranowo who was being sought as a vice president candidate, and the name Mahfud MD was found.

Apart from the trend of Prabowo-Gibran's popularity and electability being more in the top positions of polls from survey institutions, the factor of Jokowi as president is inevitable. The Jokowi government made popular policies at the end of its administration, especially by intensifying the distribution of social assistance in the form of money and food which had been carried out using APBN funds. Various social assistance was carried out intensively during the presidential election campaign season involving President Jokowi and Ministers who supported the Prabowo-Gibran candidate. These covert campaigns proceeded almost without warning from the Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu). So, politically, the Prabowo – Gibran candidate indirectly benefits the most. The pattern used by President Jokowi in playing social assistance politics was actually given the same example by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono when he won the 2009 presidential election in one round. The enthusiasm to be able to win the Prabowo - Gibran candidate in one round of voting in the 2024 presidential election was followed by criticism from various parties regarding the non-neutrality of law enforcement officials, especially the police (Polri), military (TNI) and state civil servants (ASN).

The emergence of the Jokowi factor in the 2024 presidential election has triggered reactions not only from politicians who do not support Prabowo - Gibran, but also from intellectuals and academics who are concerned about the worsening conditions of democracy in Indonesia (Farisa, 2024). Jokowi's expression of disappointment was shown, among other things, by the withdrawal of several supporters, leaving for other candidates who were not supported by Jokowi. Intellectuals expressed their disappointment by providing reviews on social media podcasts regarding the decline in the quality of democracy. Moreover, in this context, Jokowi is narrated as a Javanese Machiavelli or Javanese tyrant (Sukidi, 2023). Foreign media reports regarding the 2024 presidential election in Indonesia cannot be separated from the context of the phenomenon of declining democracy. From a policy perspective, a more comprehensive evaluation is needed in the future, so as to enable the President and state officials to truly take neutral action in elections.

As shown in Table 3, the results of the 2024 elections have changed the map of the constellation of Islamic parties in Indonesia. What is surprising is the disappearance of the PPP from the political map because it failed to win seats in parliament (DPR). PPP actually has a big chance of passing the 4% electoral threshold, but the party elites have been slow to improve their electoral contestation, so their vote support has decreased significantly (Noor, 2024). The presence of two new Islamic political parties, namely the Gelora Party and the Ummat Party, did not strengthen the Islamic political map, because both of them also failed to obtain seats in parliament, as did the PBB. This post-2024 election phenomenon shows a decline in the existence and electoral achievements of Islamic parties, especially when compared to pluralist political parties.

**Table 3. Results of votes and seats for Islamic parties in the 2024 elections**

Political Party	Votes (%)	Seats (%)
PKB	16,115,655 (10.62)	68 (11.72)
PAN	10,984,003 (7.24)	48 (8.27)
PKS	12,781,353 (8.42)	53 (9.14)
PPP	5,878,777 (3.87)	0
Gelora	1,281,991 (0.84)	0
Ummat	642,545 (0.42)	0
<b>Total</b>		<b>169 (29.13)</b>

Source: KPU, 2024 (Processed)

## Discussion

The findings above reveal complex dynamics within Indonesia's political landscape, especially regarding Islamic parties' roles and alignments within the broader democratic framework of the 2024 presidential election. The fragmentation of Islamic political parties and their alliances with various non-Islamic, open parties demonstrate a pragmatic approach rather than an ideologically cohesive one (Noor, 2016). Islamic parties in Indonesia have long been accustomed to competing or cooperating with open parties, showing their flexibility and willingness to adapt to the pluralistic and dynamic political environment of the Reform Era (Fox and Menchik, 2023). This trend persisted in 2024, where major Islamic-oriented parties, such as the PKB, PKS, and PPP, split across different candidate coalitions, illustrating their varying political goals and strategies rather than a unified ideological stance.

The distribution of Islamic parties across three presidential candidates—Anies Baswedan, Prabowo Subianto, and Ganjar Pranowo—indicates a disintegration of Islamic party coalitions (Jun, 2024). This fragmentation underscores the complexity of the multi-party system in Indonesia, where even parties grounded in similar ideological backgrounds often find themselves aligned with diverse interests. Their division across candidate lines highlights the fact that Islamic parties prioritize pragmatic alliances, likely to increase political influence rather than advance strictly Islamic agendas. This trend has persisted since 2004 when direct elections became the norm, emphasizing the challenge for Islamic parties to maintain a unified stance in presidential elections (Sebastian & Alkaff, 2024).

Furthermore, the requirements for presidential nominations, as outlined in Law Number 7/2017, Article 222, which mandates a 20% threshold of DPR seats or 25% of national votes for presidential nominations, have significant implications. Islamic parties, if united, could theoretically meet this threshold; however, their repeated divisions prevent such unity (Assyaukanie, 2019). In the 2019 legislative elections, Islamic parties collectively held 29.72% of DPR seats, which would have been sufficient to propose their candidate independently. Yet, in reality, their tendency toward fragmentation has led them to form diverse coalitions with non-Islamic parties, underscoring both the legal and practical obstacles to Islamic party unification in Indonesia.

The decline in PPP's electoral performance, evidenced by its loss of parliamentary representation in 2024, raises questions about the party's future and the broader viability of Islamic-oriented parties. Since the Reform Era, PPP has faced a downward trend in its votes and seats, which culminated in its failure to pass the electoral threshold in 2024. This decline may be due to the party's lack of strategic positioning and failure to innovate in response to shifting voter preferences. Additionally, the emergence of new Islamic parties like Gelora and Ummat has not strengthened the Islamic political landscape, as these parties also failed to secure DPR representation (Hatherell & Welsh, 2021). This post-2024 election landscape reflects a diminishing influence of Islamic parties, particularly when compared to more pluralist parties.

The role of President Jokowi, or the "Jokowi factor," has also significantly influenced the political constellations surrounding the 2024 presidential election (Fealy, 2024; Simandjuntak, 2023). His high popularity has not only affected voter sentiments but also party strategies. Jokowi's indirect endorsement of the Prabowo-Gibran ticket demonstrates how a sitting president's popularity and political maneuvers can shape alliances, overshadowing traditional party ideologies. The political coalition supporting Prabowo-Gibran benefited from government actions, such as social assistance distribution, which some critics argue represents an implicit campaign strategy reminiscent of the approach taken by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2009.

Jokowi's active involvement has drawn both support and criticism (Kimura & Anugrah, 2024). Intellectuals and academics have voiced concerns over what they perceive as a decline in democratic quality, with allegations of government partisanship and reduced neutrality among state institutions, including the police, military, and civil servants. This perceived bias has raised concerns about the trajectory of Indonesian democracy, with some critics labeling Jokowi a "Javanese Machiavelli" or even a "Javanese tyrant" (Sukidi, 2023), illustrating the growing anxiety over Indonesia's democratic integrity.

Finally, the 2024 election results indicate a shifting electoral map for Islamic parties. The PPP's absence from the DPR, alongside Gelora and Ummat's failure to gain seats, marks a significant reduction in Islamic parties' influence. In contrast, secular and pluralist parties have gained a stronger foothold, underscoring the challenges Islamic parties face in securing their place in Indonesia's increasingly complex democratic environment. This decline in Islamic parties' electoral achievements could signify a

broader shift toward pluralism in Indonesian politics, suggesting that future coalitions and political strategies may need to prioritize inclusive, cross-ideological collaboration to remain viable in the evolving democratic landscape.

## CONCLUSION

The decreasing role of Islamic parties in determining the political constellation in the 2024 presidential election coupled with the strengthening of Jokowi's influence is the latest political phenomenon in Indonesia. Since the process of nominating the Presidential Election, the campaign until the voting, the 2024 Presidential Election has been overshadowed by concerns about the issue of non-neutrality of the state apparatus which has been intensifying to win certain candidates supported by Jokowi as president. This has almost never happened in presidential elections in Indonesia since 2004, where the president has real political influence in popular politics. In the case of Indonesia, although there is more room for political maneuver in the post-New Order Reformation Era, religious parties tend to have divided political options, rather than unite. Transactional pragmatism, which is the main consideration in this context, benefits the president's position in the presidential government system in Indonesia, as can be seen from Jokowi's real influence in the 2024 presidential election.

In the party's internal context, most of them have complex problems that hinder creativity and innovation in strengthening party institutions. This problem actually occurs in almost all political parties which are characterized by strong personalization. The problem is, the figures who become symbols of party personalization in Islamic parties cannot function effectively as real party leaders. In the PPP case, for example, the split occurred even though the party chairman served as a minister in Jokowi's government cabinet. He was unable to use it as a modality to strengthen party institutions, but instead what emerged was dependency. It is the independence and conflict-prone party institutions that mark how the latest Islamic political parties present and contest in multiparty elections.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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Undang-undang (UU) Nomor 7 Tahun 2017 tentang Pemilihan Umum